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The July 2, 1992 announcement ofa cod moratorium signaled the end ofa long history of
the commercial cod fishery in Newfoundland. The burden ofblame for the collapse of
the Northern cod stock was placed on the fishery science division of the federal
Department ofFisheries and Oceans. This blame, however, was misplaced. This report
analyzes how the inherent weakness in fisheries science and its subsequent strategic
failures, facilitated the promotion ofeconomic and political policies thatledt0
overexploitation of the Northern cod resource. Further to this, the report examines the
view that globaUy there is a common pattern ofmarine exploitation that inevitably leads
to stock collapse. The Newfoundland fishery ofthe late 1990s adheres to such a pattern
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The purpose ofthis paper is to analyze the role ofweak fisheries science in the
Northern cod collapse, to determine how weak fisheries science was manipulated by
policy-makers in the use ofthe fishery to meet other objectives, and to consider if
improved fisheries science would prevent the pattern ofexploitation that leads to stock
collapse.
The 1990shas seen one of the most spectacular declines in fish stocks in the
world: the collapse ofthe once great Northern cod stock off the coast ofNewfoundland.
Fisheries science at the Department ofFisheries and Oceans (DFO) is considered
by many to be at fault for this collapse. The Independent Review Panel on the State ofthe
Northern Cod Stock (1990j, known hereafter as The Harris Report, is one ofthe most
comprehensive analysis conducted on the science ofthis stock collapse. It lays the blame
for the collapse of the Northern cod fishery squarely on " weak" fisheries science. This
paper considers how policy makers and politicians, in order to further objectives 0 fa
social and economic nature, manipulated weak science. It offers evidence ofinterference
and deliberate misinterpretation of stock assessment to legitimize overcapitalization and
to promote international trade relations. Further to this it is interesting to observe how
Canadian fisheries science was promoted as the best fisheries science in the world and
used to support a quota fishery. However, once this facade was removed by the
"unraveling" events of 1985-1989, the DFO commissioned the Harris Panelled by Dr.
Leslie Harris, to investigate fisheries science and review stock assessments at the Science
Branch, St. John's. This commissioning officially separated politicians from the
respoosibility ofthe Northern cod collapse. This report provides some background of
events leading to the establishment ofthe Harris Panel, it reviews the Harris Report and
confirms the strategicfaiJures ofscience, discusses the structure ofdecision-making
witbin the bureaucracy ofthe DFO, the objectives ofthe 1983 Kirby Report, upon which
policy was designed, and then explaios how fishery science was used to legitimize
govemmentpolicy in resource exploitation.
collapse, it is necessary to determine the influence of fisheries science in global marine
exploitation. This is facilitated by an analysis of the views ofeminent fisheries scientists
Donald Ludwig, Ray Hilborn and Carl Walters. Their controversial view, that there is a
pattern ofexploitation that inevitably leads to stock collapse, independentofscience,
mirrors the process of stock collapse in Newfoundland. Supportingevidencefortheir
viewpoint follows this analysis. The paper concludes that, contrary to Dr. Harris's view
that science is our only hope in the prevention ofoverexploitation, it is the will ofsociety
that will ultimately determine appropriate marine exploitation. Good science can helpto
inform but the respoosibility to eosure marine resource protection is with each one ofus.
It is our responsibility to manage our technology, curb our greed and protect our fish
decline in the abundance ofthe Northern cod stock. Between 1962 and 1977, the
biornass ofNorthern cod available forbarvest bad declined by 82 percent from an
estimated 3 million tonnes to 526,000 tonnes (Hutchings, 1999). Offurtherimportance,
in the mid-1950s Newfoundland vessels landed 97 per cent of the fish caught in waters
adjacent to the Northeast coast of the province. By 1975, their share had dropped to 8 per
cent, as foreign vessels with factory freezer trawlers heavily exploited the resource
offshore. In order to gain domestic control ofthe situation, the Canadiangovemment,in
1977, declared a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)(McCorquodale, 1994). The
aimwastosetinplaceaneconomicallysoundharvestannuallyandtoaIIowthecod
stocks to rebuild. The establishment of the DFO in 1979 (formerly the Department of
Fisheries and Environrnent) was to satisfy this aim through its Science Branch. "The
primary institutional functions ofthe Science Branch ofthe Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Center in SL John's is the provision ofscientific advice for the rationalmanagementof
commercialexploitationofregionalbiologicalmarineresources"(Finiayson,1994,p.l).
The immediate consequence of the establishment of the 200-ruile limit was a decrease in
fishing mortality as the foreign fleets were evicted. As Canada had yet to develop its
trawler fleet, this lull in trawler activity permitted a modest stock recovery between I977
and 1985. In fact, the harvested biomass approxirnately doubled (Hutchings, 1999).
However. it was unclear at the time whether this increase in landings was due to areal
increase in resource abundance, a greater fishing effort, more efficient techniques,
improved familiarity of the skippers and fleet managers with seasonal movements of the
resource or some complex combination of these factors (Finlayson, 1994).
A1thoughcodeatchremained essentiaIIy static through 1987, the inshore catch
declined while the offshore catch increased. This is important as it prompted inshore
fishermentoquestionDFO stock estimates as early as 1985. This led to a paper by Dr.
George Wwters ofDFO in 1986 suggesting that DFO's abundance estimates were
significantly wrong. Tbispaperwasfiledaway(Hurchingsetal.,1997).
In 1986 the Newfoundland Inshore Fisheries Association(NIFA) responded to a
growing discrepancy berweenits membership's perception ofthe stock's condition and
that ofDFO. Three biologists from Memorial University ofNewfoundland were
commissioned to conduct the first irldependent reviewofDFO stock assessments. This
report, known as the Keats Report, was highly critical ofDFO's data sources, statistical
proceduresandconclusions.ltdeterminedthatsinceI977,insteadofcatchingtherarget
harvestable biomass ofapproximately 20 per cent or Fo., (see Strategie Failures), the
annual eatch had been somewhere between thirty and fifty percent! This rate of
exploirationgave some credibility to the inshore fishermen's perception that the stock
was in decline. DFOdismissedthereportas"superficial". However, in 1987,the
persistence ofcriticismofDFO science and the growing public support in the media
compeUedthefederal Minister ofFisheries, TomSiddon, to create the Task Group 0 n
Newfoundland Inshore Fisheries (TGNIF),chairedbyfisheriesscientistDr. D.L.
Alverson. The Alverson Report conclusions, were not substantially different from those
of the Keats Report. "Chronic. overly optimistic interpretations ofdata ofquestionable
validity had resulted in a persistent underestimation a/fishing mortality and an
overestimation ofthe growth ofthe biomass since 1977" (Finlayson, 1994, p. 40).
The work ofAlverson brought vigorous debate within DFO, particularly the
Science Branch. This debate was to result in the radical reduction (by about one-third) of
the 1989 estimate ofthe Northern cod biomass by the Canadian Atlantic Fisheries
Scientific Advisory Committee (CAFSAC). It is through CAFSAC that scientific
information was communicated belWeen fisheries scientists and the managers in the
ScienceBranchofDFO. According to Finlayson this was the first reduction in current-
year estimate since the advent ofthe 200-mile limit in 1977 (Finlayson, 1994). The
atmosphere of growing skepticism ofDFO's scientific knowledge spread from its origins .
in the inshore sector ofthe fishery to include influential members ofthe public and the
media The institutional authorityofDFO was under siege. The importance of the
authority ofscience is crucial in order to allow the Minister ofFisheries justification for
quota allocations among competing user groups. Without the prestige and authority of
science to legitimize these decisions, there is political crisis. "InthespringofI989,it
became abundantly clear to the Minister ofFisheries, Tom Siddon, that his department's
official construction ofreality was passing beyond criticism and becoming the object of
ridiculeandcontempt"(Finiayson,1994,p.63).
This "unraveling" ofauthority called for a new action. TheministerappointedDr.
Leslie Harris, then President cfMemorial University ofNewfoundland and a historian, as
chair of the Independent Review Panel on the State ofthe Northern Cod Stock. It was
against this background ofcrisis in authority and prestige at DFO that Dr. Harris and his
panel went to work. The Harris Report confirms major problems in stock assessment and
fisheries science. It is an integral part of this paper because it put responsibility for the
Northern cod collapse on fisheries science at DFO, thus separating policy-makers and
politicians from the tragedy. Therefore. this reportwiIl begin with a review of the Harris
Report.
A Review of the Harris Report
On February 12, 1989, the DFO, under Minister Tom Siddon, established the
seven member Northern Cod Review Panel headed by Memorial University President,
Dr. Leslie Harris. 1t examined the history and complexity ofthe Northern cod stock, the
data used in assessing and forecasting catches, the methodologies used in Canada and
other countries and the calculations leading to the startling 1989 stock assessment. The
Panel released an interim report in May 1989 and a final report in February 1990 to new
Fisheries Minister Bernard Valcourt. This section provides some historical background
ofthe Newfoundland fishery and summarizes the Panel's findings and recommendations.
advice provided by the DFO since 1977 on the Northern cod stock, the current state and
size of the stock, and make recommendations regarding stock assessment methods and
means with a view to better forecasting the size, growth potential and behavior of the
stock in future (Harris Report, 1990,p. 11). In fulfillment of its mandate, the Panel
examined a number of issues, the key one being the explanation for the variance between
current and earlier scientific advice on the state ofthe 2J, 3K, 3Lstock.
3.1 Historical Background
The establisbment in February 1989 ofthe seven-member Northern Cod Review
Panel reflected grave concerns regarding the state of the Northern Cod stocks. Itis
important to consider the events prior to 1989 and include some historical background.
The abundance of marine resources and particularly ofNorthern cod, was the
beginniog around the 1500s. Until 1950, nature imposed management ofthe resource
through the inherent physical, seasonal and geographic limitations on fishing, thus
. providing sustainable resource usage (Harris Report, p.23). Intheearlyl950s,the
introduction ofnew high seas technology, the factory freezer trawler, led to significant
increases in Northern cod landings. This created the need for international management
ofhigh seas and foreign fishing. In 1949, the International Commission for Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (lCNAFl had been formed to provide the fishing industry ofcoastal
states with scientific information and statisticaJ data. The new era in high seas fishing
required more ofICNAF than the mandate suggested. The Harris Report determines that
"as an agency for conservation ICNAF was a total failure" (Harris Report, p. 7). The new
high seas technology, and an unregulated harvest through the 1960s, led to apeak landing
ofNorthern cod in 1968 of8l0,OOO tonnes (Harris Report,p.2). By the early 1970s the
once abundant Northem cod stock was in decline as it dropped from average landings of
220,000 tonnesto 250,000 tonnes in the early 1900sto 172,OOOtonnesbyl956to a low
of35,OOOtonnesin 1974 (Harris Report, p. 26).
In 1977, Canada declared a 200 nautical mile jurisdictional limit in an attempt,
though belated, to regain control of its ailing marine resources. The social and economic
impact that the decline ofNorthern cod landings visited upon coastal communities gave
Conference. In 1982, the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
extended the rights ofall coastal states to a 200 mile jurisdiction of their marine resource.
With the declaration ofthe EEZ in 1977, Canada adopted a prograrn of
conservationandstockregeneration. AsNorthemcodwasconsideredthespeciesunder
most immediate and urgent threat, Canada established a strategy, a strategic objective
whichtheyidentifiedasFo.,strategy.lbisimpliedthattheywould1imittheannuaicatch
to approximately 20 per cent ofthe exploitable biomass. TheDFO believed that ifthe
fishing mortality rate was held at approximately 20 per cent and iftheir predictions about
natural mortality and recruitment were correct, together these three elements would lead
to a growth in the stock that would very quicldy see it retum to where an annual harvest
ofuptofourhundredthousandtoonescouldeasilybetaken(HarrisReportI990}.
However, the basic model for stock assesment that this implied was very seriously flawed
(see Findings}. By early 1989, it was clear that at least a short-term crisis was at band.
The "red tlag" was the January 1989 revision ofthe Canadian Atlantic Fishery
Scientific Advisory Committee (CAFSAC) estimate ofthe status ofNorthern cod. (1bis
is the scientific unit that reco=ends allowable catches.) The 1989 TAC for Northern
cod had been set in late 1988 at 266,000 toones. The revision of the TAC in January
1989 by CAFSAC was a reco=ended decrease of50 percent from 266,000 to 125,000
tonnes. lbis sent shockwaves through the Atlantic fisheries system and shattered
perceptions that the Northern cod stock was increasing and would continue to do s0
(parsons, 1993}. In spite of this reco=endation the Minister set the TAC at 235,000
tonnesinFebruaryl989. It is worth noting that the actual catch ofNorthern cod in 1989
was just 215,000 tonnes (Schrank eta/. 1992,p.285).
Due to the implications this had for Atlantic Canadian fishing communities,
parricularly Newfoundland, Fisheries Minister Tom Siddon established an Independent
Review of the State ofthe Northern Cod Stock, headed by Dr. Leslie Harris, President of
Mernorial University (hereafter known as "The Panel"} to explain the reasons for the
3.2 Findings
To fulfill its mandate, the Harris Panel used the resources ofthe DFO: the library,
data sources and expertise. The presence ofpanel members Dr. DL. Alverson and Mr.
JobnG. Pope brought stock assessment methodology expertise and back-up support of
computer facilities (as well as their experience from the DFO-appointed Alverson Review
in 1987). In completion ofthe final report, public hearings were held throughout
Newfoundland and in Halifax. Inshore and offshore fisbermen, maj"r fishing companies,
the fishermen's union and other special interest groups made presentations. (Harris
Report, 1990, p. 13). The findings underscore Dr. Harris's stalement that "we neither
fully comprehend the complexities ofthe natural world that Northern cod inhabit nor
rea\izethe full impact ofnatural adjustments to human activity" (Harris Report, p. 129).
The findings are numerous and broad. Therefore, they are categorized here under
four headings, and then surnmanzed: (a) the state of the cod stocks, (b) fisheries
management, (c) science: assessments and resources, and (d) overcapitalization. The
"science" category receives a more in depth summary due to its role in the establishment
The Harris Panel found that though Northern cod stocks did grow significantly in
years inunediatelyfollowingthe200-miIeextension in 1977, that panern ofgrowth
reversed and stock declined. The Panel expressed concern that the decline in recruitment
(the young ofapopulation species enter into a fishery at a particular age; for Northern
cod it is at ages 3, 4 and 5), coupled with the continued catch levels experienced during
1986, 1987, and 1988 had sharply eroded the gains that had been made in rebuilding the
Northem cod stocks during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Northem cod stock
complex exhibit a strong relationship between recruitment levels and size ofthe spawning
biomass. (The population ofcod that are sexually mature and involved in spawning.) The
downturn in recruitment suggested that the catch level could not be maintained without
causing a significant decline in the exploitable and spawning biomass (Harris Report, p.
64). In fact, the biomass had declined to 488,000 tonnes in late 1989 from 1,140,000
tonnes in 1985 (Hutchingsetal. 1995).
The Panel found that there were 00 stock-specific management measures. Fish
withinstatisticaidivision2J3KLbadbeenmanagedasonestockunitoveraperiodofl6
years. The assumption that it could, in fact, be managed as one stock, was never tested
(HarrisReport,1990,p.77).
Finally, the Panel found that there were enormous gaps in koowledge ofNorthem
codas fishery scientists concentrated resources on stock assessment. It is surprising that
something ofsuch fundamental importance was lacking in the information needed to
generate scientific advice (Harris Report, p. 118). The mathematical models became
more important than the species. "We aczedin substantial ignorance ofthe biology ofthe
animals...and in almost total ignorance ofthe dynamics afthe ecosystem in which they
existed"(Harris,inL.Hinds,1995,p.28I).
3.4 Fisheries Management
The Panel analyzed the organizatioo ofmanagemeot and sciencewithinDFO.
They described these two groups, operating independent ofeach other, as the
"segregation ofscience and management into watertight compartments." The Panel felt
thattheeffectivenessofgoodstrategiesintherespectivegroupswasundercutbyalackof
coordinated effort. As well, it was noted that there was not enough communication
between the modeling group and the disciplines of fisheries oceanography and fish
biology. The Panel felt that the lack of input from fisheries oceanography in stock
assessment modeling had contributed to this crisis (Harris Report, pp. 41, 84 and 93).
The Panel found that the failure ofcoordination between federal andprovinciai
jurisdictions lead to conflicts in goals and objectives. Reconcilingsocio-economicneeds
offishing communities with the biologicaiimperatives of the stock is abaiancingact
between goals ofconservation and ofsocio-economic requirements ofpeople and
communities (Harris Report, pp. 42, 96, 108). It is important to note that among these
con.fIictingjurisdictionaigoaisistheissueofforeignfishing.
"It is difficult to make the average Newfoundlandfisherman understand what
interests afstate compel the Canadian Government to penni! a largeforeignfleet
tocontinueJishingwithinthetwohundredmileeconomiczone...when inshore nets
lie empty, and trawlers are tied up." (Harris Report, p. 106).
The need for Newfoundland to maximize economic benefits of the fisheryareincon.fIict
with the Federai goai of using fishing concessions to furtherexternai relations objectives
(Harris Report, p. 106).
offshore interests. "In ail of the presentations made to the Panel, whether in written or
oral form, no single issue appeared more frequently than this and none evoked more
passionate protestations." (HarrisReport,p.43). Inshore fishermen felt that their
landings declined due to enormous technologicaieffort followed by offshore fleets. This
is not scientificailyproven but anecdotal accounts support this claim, with concerns noted
of the disturbance ofspawning activity (Harris Report, p. 43).
The Panel found that Fo., (here constitutes an annual fishing mortality ofabout 20
percent of the exploitable biomass) as a management strategy would have led to
significant growtb in the Nortbern cod stock if it had been followed. With management
decisions based upon faulty advice, fishing rates soared to well over Fo., or more than
double the desired level. Thus the spawoing s10ck faiIed to grow as rapidly, lowering
curreotyields (Harris Report, p. 103).
The Panel felt that there was room forirnprovement in the planning process with a
need for greater measures ofopenness and better communications with interest/client
groups and for input from such groups (Harris Report, p. 120).
It was the significant difference in scientific advice on setting Total Allowable
Catch (TACs) in 1989 from that ofearlier years that instigated the formation of the Harris
PaneI.Therefore,itishelpfultoanalyzethePanel'sobservationsregardingtheresearch
methods and data used by DFO scientisls.
Sound fisheries management requires a good knowledge of the dynamics offish
stocks and their interactions with environments. Mathematical models are commouly
used to describe the dynamics ofa fish stock and its ecosystem. These models are fitted
to data collected from fisheries and scientific surveys. The Panel confirmed that earlier
scientific advice had been overly optimistic. According to the Harris Panel
.....thebasisforthesigniftcantdifferenceinthe1989scientificadvicefromthatof
earlier years results in part, from the addition ofa new analytical method of
handling the data inputs, in par/from the changes in the state ofthe stock which
have occurred since 1986; and inpartfrom a signiftcant adjustment in the 1986
researchvessel(R,?survey, abundance estimates... " (Harris Report, 1990,p.73-
74).
Why such variations? There were reasons for such numerous seemingly controllable
variables. The Panel found that a number ofstock assessment methods lacked the ability
to measure changes in recruitment and abundance. ThePaneldeterminedthatboththe
research vessel (RV) data and the commercial catch data were incorrect. This is crucial
data used in stock assessment models. Also ofinterest, is the finding that scientists
intentionally disregard ecological factors to avoid bias in their findings. Forexample,
scientistsdisregardthatcodseekoutidealconditionsofwatertemperature,salinity,and
availability of food. This exposes the research to error that may vary from less than 10
per cent to SO per cent or more. TheypointedoutthatFo.,forrnulawasflawedbecauseit
did not recognize the need to maintain asuflicient number ofolder age spawning
Steele, Andersen and Green (1992) disagree with the Harris Panel's explanation
for the difference in advice and note that the basic inforrnationthatclearly showed the
problemwasavaiJableasearlyasI986(Steeleetal.,1992p.S3). CabotMartinfeltthat
the Panel's attention to this difIerence ofadvice was not given enongh prominenceinthe
report. lILessthanonepagewasspenton'ExplanationfortheDifferenceBetweenthe
CurrentandEarlierScientificAdvice'''(Martin,1994,p.8).
The Harris Panel noted that the database ofDFO science was not comprehensive
enough for the complex task at hand. Such a database does not give any definitive
answers with respect to the relationships among the several components of the Northern
cod stock complex overtime. The Panel found that historical catch per unit ofeffort
(CPUE) data from the inshore fleets acoustic survey data and environmental indices of
availability and abundance shouId have played a larger role indevelcpingabundance
estimates and resource forecasting.
The independent estimates ofpopuIation trends require much closer scrutiny.
Finally, the two indices used to tune virtual popuIation analysis (VPA) and/or cohort
analysis to establishannuaiTACs are not completely reliable in that they areinfluenced
by environment change, operational changes in the fishery and/or survey, and the
introduction ofnew technology. In fact, technological advances in catchability were so
rapid that the unit ofeffort as a measurement becarne meaningless (Harris Report, 1990,
pp. 50,60,61 and 78).
The Panel found that the "discard mentality" in inshore and offshore fisheries was
worrisome and contributed to underestimates of fishing mortality (Harris Report, 1990,
p.80).Also,theabsenceofanestimateofcodlossesduetobycatchlossesisnot
properly accounted for in tuning VPA (Harris Report, p. 60). "We failed to account
adequately formisreporting, discarding, high-grading and bycatch" (Harris as quoted in
Hinds,1995,p.281).
The Panel found that knowledge regarding predator and prey relationships should
be used in developing finer stock assessment methodology. Abetter understanding ofthe
relationshipsbetweensealsaodcod,codandcapelin,andcapelinandsealsarenecessary
for such incorporation.
Finally, the resources available to DFO scientists were lacking in somerespects
accordingtothePanel. Theshortageofdataprocessingcapacitymeantthatscientists
were unable to access computer facilities in a timely manner (Harris Report, 1990,p.94).
This inhibited, somewhat, the prioritizing of the use ofobserver data from offshore tleet
and smallertrawlersfgillnetters andlonglinervessels. The Panel also found that there is a
need for scientists to go to sea more often, and noted thatRV cmises offouror five
weeks are inadequate to observe appropriate detail over such a large territory. Aswell,
the research vessels lacked state ofthe art electronic equipment. The Panel observed that
resources for surveillance have not matched the changes that have taken place in the
fishery over the years (Harris Report,pp. 94, ll8,l25and 126). Ina 1992 address, Dr.
Harris said, "We continued for too !oog to wear our rose tinted glasses and to interpret all
data in the manner best calculated to support and confum the model ofgrowthupoo
3.6 Overcapitalization
ThePanelfoundthatthe_"euphoriaattitude"foliowingextensiooofthe200-mile
limit in 1977 led to overcapitalization in both the harvesting and processing sectors. The
bright prospects ofopen access to a larger resource base compounded with actual initial
stock growth led to the iarge investments in boats and gear, as well as in new and
improved plants and processing facilities. This placed heavier demands upon stocks. "As
fish stocks decline, catches may still be maintained by increased fishing effort brought
about through improved technology, the use oflargervessels, the deployment ofmore
gear" ...therebysuggestinginterpretations ofabundance that would justify high TACs as
opposedtoapolicyofconserv~tion(HarrisReport,1990,p.42).
Overcapitalization in the processing sector put political and social pressures upon
govem.ments and encouraged them to "err on the side ofoverexploitation rather than on
thesideofconservatioo" (Harris Report, 1990). In concluding, the report addresses this
resulting overcapacity and asks should the fishery become the preserve of professional
fishermen and plant worlcers, all ofwhom can earn an adequate living from it, or should it
continue as at present asocial reliefmechanism? (Harris Report, 1990, p.150).
The Panel concluded its findings with tte determination that current catch levels
simply could not be maintained without causing a significant and potentially very serious
decline in the exploitable and spawning biomass. As Michael Harris (1998) slates, Dr.
Harris pointed a damning yet compassionate finger at the Science Branch fordisastrous
advicegiven. Ultimately, a shadow was cast on the research methods and data used by
DFOscientists. Would this tragedy have occurred without such disastrous scientific
advice? TItis paper seeks to answer this question.
The Harris Panel felt that ifthe tragic decline of the Norlhem cod was to be
stopped, immediate steps had to be taken to grow the size ofthe spawning biomass. In
Harris's opinion, Ottawa's reduced 1990 TAC of 190,000 tonnes might not serve to
reverse the trend ofa declining spawning stock but could contribute to further decline
(HarrisReport,1990,p.136). To this end. the Harris Panel made twenty-nine
reco=endations for future management of this stock and forstrenglheningthescientific
basis for management.
Twenty-six of the twenty-nine reco=endations were accepted for further
research and/or adopted. However, three key recommendations were not accepted.
ThePanelstronglyreco=endedthat"inrespectoftheNorlhemcodstock(s),asa
matter ofurgency, there should be an immediate reduction of fishing mortality to the
levelofatleast0.30andattheearliestfeasibledate,tothelevelofO.20."(HarrisReport,
1990,p.151). The Fedeta! govemmentresponded by stating:
"The TAC has already been reduced by 25 per cent since 1988 in order to
conserve the resource. The lowering of/he TAe is consistent with the
government's long-term conservation gools. Future TAGS will depend on
scientific assessments and industry consultations. taking into account thesoci0-
economic impact".
This unleashed a wave ofprotest from scientists, academics and interest groups as it was
the central recommendation ofa comprehensive report;
Recommendation # 23: the establishment ofa new fisheries management board or
Recommendation # S: unitateta! action by Canada to acquire management rights for
straddling stocks beyond the 200 mile limit.
In rejecting Recommendation # 23, the Federal govemment stated that a number
ofexisting consultative methods provide Newfoundland with the opportunities to receive
information and provide feedback and input. Recommendation # 5 was not accepted, as
"this recommendation is incompatible with the international Law ofthe Sea".
In a later interview with Michael Harris, Dr. Harris conceded "you really didn't
have to read very hard between the lines ofour report to find that in making these
recommendations, we were walking on the edge ofa precipice." (M. Harris, 1998, p.
296).
Among the findings that were accepted for further research and study and/or
adopted were:
-areductionfstoppageoffishingduringspawningseason;
- new gear regulations to prevent harvesting ofjuvenile fish;
- aredistributionoffishingeffortin2J,3K,3Luponrelativedistributitionofthe
exploitable biomass;
- DFO to develop means to estimate stock and stock trends beyond current RV
and large trawler CPUE data;
-toattainaclearerunderstandingofrebuildingspawningstocks;
-toincreaseobservercoverageinordertoaddressbycatehconcems;
-researchandincorporationintoappropriatedatapredator-preyrelationships;
- expanded data collection to include more input from and contact with
fishermen;
- an increase in surveillance and enforcement with substantial penaIties for
violations to fisheries regulations;
-are.examinationofbalancingbiological,ecologicalandsocio-economicgoals
with respect to fisheries;
- a more coordinated management approach to include more open
communications among interest groups;
- new agreements and arrangements with universities and foreign colleagues,
revised licensing practices to consider part-time fishing regulations
-expansionoftheknowledgebasefordevelopingnewstockassessmentmodeIs,
such as integrating other disciplines in stock assessment;
- implementation ofaprocess whereby scientific advice is developed utilizing
state of the stock analysis more efficiently
- that stock assessment be subject to rigorous peer review.
Most importantly, the Harris Panel emphasized that fisheries science and
management should always proceed with caution (Harris Report, 1990,pp. 151-154).
Following the release ofthe Harris Report, an Implementation Task Force on Northern
Cod (also known as the Dunne TaskForce) was given the mandate to carry out the
necessaryconsultationwith"fishennen,fishermen'sorganizations,processors.municipal
leaders andprovincial government officials in order to workout an acceptable
implementationplan"(Emery,p.19).
In May 1990, a five-year $584 million Atlantic Fisheries Adjustment Program (AFAP)
was announced. It was designed to address the major challenges facing the Atlantic
fishery such as rebuilding the fish stocks, adjusting to current realities and economic
diversification (Hinds, 1995). At the same time, the Northem Cod program was
announced: over five years $40 million would be spent on twenty-five projects designed
to learn more about the basic biology and environment ofNorthern cod as a response t0
recommendations of the Harris Panel. 'tThenecessityofsuchacrashprogramoncod
biology underscores the decline in biological studies on cod and other ground fish that
hadoccurredinrecentyears"(Steeleetal.,1992,p.53)..
In February 1992,DFOintroducedaconservationceilingonNortherncodand
reduced the original TAC by 35 percent-this ended the winter offshore trawler fishery.
Other restrictive measures were also included. On July 2, 1992, new fisheries minister
John Crosbie announced a two-year moratorium on the Northern cod fishery. Today,
almosteigbtyearslater,thereisstillamoratoriumontheNortherncodfishery.
In spite of the urgent findings and detailed recommendations of the Harris report,
DFO was slow to acknowledge a disaster in the making. 11lis is an important point and
central to this paper. Ifthe social and political will is lacking, no amount ofscientific
information or good advice can initiate change.
3.8 The Harris Report and Fisberies Policy
ThecbangesinfisheriesthatoccurredfollowingthereleaseoftheHarrisReport
were basically management cbanges: the licensing process was modified; the capelin
fishery is now subject to a TAC that is 10 per cent ofthe total biomass; there is increased
surveillance, enforcement, and penalties for violators of fisheries regulations; there are
new gear restrictions, among others. These are important changes yet the significance of
the Harris Report lies in the fact that it was communicated so fully and credibly to the
public. The highly regarded Dr. Harris accomplished what Derek Keats and D. Lee
Alverson were denied in their respective reports in 1986 and 1987. AccordingtoMicbael
"[with the Harris Report} attacking the messenger wasn '( as easy as it had been when
the Keats Report was dismissed as the work ofa scientist still wet behind the ears.
Harris was too highly respected and the evidence produced by his panel too
overwhelming, to be talked away by even the most silver-tongued bureaucrat".
(MichaeIHarris,1998,p.121).
The findings of all tbreereports were "remarkably similar" (Finlayson, 1994,p.80). Yet,
Harris was heeded. DFO scientist Jake Rice in Finlayson (1994) says that Harris was
listened to because "events had led the political system to need to discredit our advice
rather than share some of the responsibility for any oftheir own poor use ofour advice"
(Finlayson, 1994,p.31). This point underlines the separation ofdecision-makers from
science once scientific authority is challenged. The wrath of the public can be unleashed
The Harris Report confirms the problems with stock assessment that the inshore
fishennenhadraisedinl985andweresubsequentlyeiahoratedonintheKeatsand
Alversonreports. The Harris Report pinpoints four areas of failure in fisheries science
and stock assessment for Northern cod. They are surnmarized here to underline the
reason for such poor stock assessments. The failures are the Fo.1 strategy, data collection,
stock assessment models, and understanding of the life history ofthe Northern cod.
Together these failures permitted decision-makers to interpret stock assessment advice
broadly and then base decisions on objectives that had little to do with science. Ecologist
Robert Costanza writes that uncertainty in science and environmental issues can often be
manipulated by political and economic interestgroups.(Costanza.1993). Thereforea
brief analysis ofthese failures is in order.
4.1 Fo.1
In 1976 rCNAF adopted an exploitation strategy ofFo.1 as the basis for recommending
TACs to member governments. When NAFO took over from rCNAF in r979 the use of
Fo.1 continued. The management strategy ofDFO from 1977 to 1992 was based on Fo.1 -
a level of fishing mortality that would allow approximately 20 percent ofthe harvestabIe
biomass to be caught by commercial fishing every year. To maintain harvest rates at the
20percenttargel,thestockwasreguIatedonthebasisofcatchquotasortotalallowabie
catch (TAC). In contrast, changes in harvesting capacity were not monitored (Hutchings,
1999). History shows that this was an inappropriate level ofharvest as is evident in the
Harris Report.
The success ofa catch-quota management system depends on the reliability ofthe
estimate ofstock size and on the accuracy ofthe reported statistics on catches, the
cornerstone ofthe TAe strategy. Errors in these will become manifest as errors in the
settingofTACsatFo., levels. This leads to the next two strategic failures: data collection
surveys were used to describe trends in Northern cod abundance. Catch rate was assumed
to be directly proportional to abundance Le. a given increase in catch rate reflected a
given increase in stock size, an assumption that now appears unjustified. The use ofdata
overestimationofstocksizeintheI980s(Hutchings,1999)."Thesizeoftheirjobsand
the relative scarcity of their fiscal resources have forced fisheries scientists to reIyheavily
on catch and effort data from harvesters in their stock assessments." (Sinclair, 1988, p.
88). In fact the largest single data source was the offshore fishery. This has led to a
distortion ofscientific data by misreporting and not reporting catches, high grading and
illegal use ofsrnall mesh sizes and of nets.
Before his death in 1995, fisheries scientist Ray Beverton wrote (paper published
in 1998) that management by quota allows build-up of fishing pressure held in checkby
mesh and gear regulations, which are difficult ifnotirnpossibleto enforce. 'Technical
measures' are then used by industry to escape effort control. Bevertongivesfivereasons
why TAC quotas have been a total disaster. He says many fisheries catch mixed species;
itisirnpossibleto forecast incoming recruitment accurately; landing limits have been
widely disregarded; underreportinghas degraded the datahase and confidence between
fishermen and scientists has been destroyed (Bevenon. 1998). Inshore data, even though
it accounted for one-third to one-halfofall Northem cod landings, was routinely ignored
asadatasource. Themisreporting,commonintheoflShoredatahaseweakensand
threatens the authority and credibility ofscience. Littlewonderthatindustryhassuch
poor regard for fisheries scientists. They knowingly supply scientists with skewed data
and then feel justified in ignoring scientists' assessments. There is good reason then. in
Dr. Harris's staternentthat the entire fish community, including harvesters, processors
and corporations was disenchanted with the quality ofDFO's scientific advice (M. Harris,
1998,p.122). Also, it is important to understand why catch rates increase even with a
declining resource. Trawlers have the ability to maintain high catch rates because the
catchabilityofcodincreasesasabundancedeclines. Cod congregate to spawn, feed and
migrate. Such a relationship is expected in fisheries where search is highlyeflicient,
abundance declines (Hilborn and Walters, 1992). Technology provides efficient catch
and find operations. This contributed to the overestimation of the stock.
The high probability ofoverestimating stock size should have been clear, given
that commercial fishing fleets do not sample the population at random and that increases
in catch rate can be largely due to increases in harvesting efficiency. "Themain
consequence of this overestimation ofstock size was that from 1978 to 1983, realized
fishing mortality rates exceeded the targeted Fo., level by more than two-fold and between
1984 and 1989 by more than three-fold." (Hutchingsetal., 1995). Continued reliance
upon commercial catch rate data reflected managernent's prediction ofrapid growth for
thestockduringthelale 1970s and early 1980s. The over1yoptimistic growthrale
assumplionsledlomarkedlyincreasedindustrialandgovernmenlinvestmenl,includinga
financialreslIUcturingoftheoffshoretrawlerindustIy. This aclivity fuelled a
socioeconomic and political oplimism in the fishery thaI possessed considerahle
momentum. It is interesting 10 walch how this momentum drove the decline of the stocks
in spite ofwhat the scientists discovered in the late 1980s (seeOvercapitallzation).
Research surveys are another primary means ofeslimatingcommercially fished
stock. They have been conducted lhrougb the entire managernent unit ofthe Northern
codslocksince1981. Annually, these surveys have consisted of300 10 500 thirty-minule
lowS bya slern-hauled bottom trawl at randomly selected localions within each of75-80
samplingareasorstrala. The data from these surveys provide the only available
independenteslimalesofstockabundances and are typically reported as a mean biomass
or number per low (Hulchings, 1999).
Sidney Holt (1998) believes thaI there musl be some realization thaI necessary
eslimales OfSlock abundance must come from direcl research surveys and nol from
performance ofcommercial operations. Between 1978 and 1985 when the commercial
calchdata suggesled the Northern cod stock had more than tripled in size, the survey data
indicaled a 50 percent increase albesl. II is inlerestingto note thaI an arbitrary decision
was made to use the mid-point of the two calchrale trends in the slock assessmenl
(Hulchings, 1999 and Finlayson, 1993).
Ina 1992 address Dr. Leslie Harris says that we did not have the courage 10 rely
upon the besl scientific dala-thal derived from the scienlificsurvey. It was not perfect
but gave results that were reasonably good and scientifically accurate, withindefinable
limits. It also gave results that in early years (1985) showed that the strategic plan was
not working "...the desire to believe the model, to believe that the swckwas growing at an
appropriate level, outweighed the desire to accept the results ofthe survey" (M. Harris,
1998). Thetewas no room for low stock assessment results in the massive fishery
investment scheme that was underway.
Before concluding this section on datacoLIection, it is llsefulto consider the data
Canadian federal fisheries received from ICNAF upon assuming management of the 200-
mile limit in 1977. This was data on stock growth and abundance. Dt.L.Harrisbelieves
that this was "faulty" data or "inflated" data. ICNAF prepared the fitst management plan
followingCanada's200-miIeextension. This set thepattem for all subsequent
management plans. The goal was to rebuild the spawning biomass at the new refetence
point F•. ,. This set the TAC fot 1977 at 160,000 tonnes. Dr. Harris felt that it was in
ICNAF's best interests to set it high considering the advantages this would mean for its
member states. Under the terms of the Law ofthe Sea Convention, any stock swplus to a
state's own need could be fished by foteignnations within the200-mile limit. Therefote
ICNAF was under no great constraint to be conservative in estimating the size of the
biomass in terms ofthe figures it was giving to the Canadian Department ofFisheries and
Environment (forerunner to DFO) in 1977 (L. Harris, 1992). This crucial data input for
stock assessment had serious problems. It would appear that Canada started management
ofthe200-miIelimitwithinflateddataandthereafter,receivedflaweddatafromits
prime data source, the offshore fleet.
One ofthe primary means ofestimating the size ofa commercially fished stock is
virtual population analysis (VPA) or cohort analysis.
"VPA involves tracking and estimating the annual mortality afeach year-class of
fish. Each age group is referred to as a 'yt!l2r-elass' offish and is identified by
the spawning season from which it arose. For example. the 1986-year class will
befouryears old in 1990. By counting the number of1982 year-elassfish caught
in each successtveyear until no more ofthesefish are eaught and adding to this
the estimated number of1982flSh that died ofnatural causes. one can. by 1995 or
so. know approximately how manyfish were in the 1982 year class" (Finlayson.
1994,p.33).
The accuracyofVPAestimates ofstock size depeod on the validity oftwo primary
assumptions-thatcommercial catch data are reported without error (see Data
CoUection) and that natural mortaIity is constaot from one year to the next and does not
vary with age (HutchingsI999,p.263). It is assumed to occur at an annual rateof20
perceotforallyear-elasses. Yel, both of these sources have no acceptable levels of
reliability. Dr. Leslie Harris in a 1992 address says that scientists "applied in the
assessment ofstock size the crudest ofmathematical models that were so flawed they
could not possibly produce answers that were even close to being right." (For a detailed
explanation ofstock assessment methods see Hutchings etal., 1995 and Finlayson,
1994.)
4.4 Lack of Knowledge orlbe Biology orlbe Species
According to McCorquodale (1994), "the biologists forgot that marine science is
a very non-<juantifiable science and lulled byfalse data signals comingfrom rising catch
levels theyfailedto recognize the high risk involved with state-of-thestockassessments
based on relatively short and unreliable data series." It would appear that over-reliance
on the mathematical modeling offish population dynamics was not counter-balanced
with an adequate understanding ofthe interrelatedness ofenvironmental factors. the life
history and behavioral aspects ofthe Northem cod or the characteristics ofthe inshore
andoffshorefishingoperations(McCorquodale. 1994.pp.88-89).
Resource management regulations rely upon sound knowledge ofthe life history
ofthe species understudy. This information includes age-andsize-specific schedules of
survival and fecundiry. population structure. predator and prey relationships.
environmental influences affecting feeding. spawning and migrating strategies. In
practice and according to L. Hanis (1990) and Hutchings etal. (1995). the effort
allocated to the collection of such biological data was limited. For example, scientists did
not know whether there was one stock ofNorthem cod or many sub-stocks that make up
a stock complex; they knew little about migratory patterns, little about what determined
growth rates, why cod in some geographical parts of the region grew at a faster rate than
others, scientists knew little about spawning behavior, fecundiry. egg and larval survival
ratesandnaturalmortaliry. The resources within DFO were to be used on stock
assessment modeling. The scientists worked under tight deadlines - deadlines that
required information for setting the annual TAC. "Biology became subservient to math
inbothstaffingandphilosophy"(Beverton,1998,p.233).
Together these four strategic failures in fisheries science and stock assessment
allowed for broad interpretations ofthe realiry of resource abundance. Thisweak
fisheries science was easy to manipulate as decision-makers sought to enforcepolicies
that met other objectives. According to Wooster(1988),weakness in science is
manipulated when management is willing to accept unfavorable outcomes to obtain some
other objective, for example to keep a fishery open for social and economic reasons.
Secondly, it occurs when management selects an inappropriate measure for bringing a
desired effect or by failing to utilize or enforce a measure that would otherwise have
worked, for example when quota regulations are not enforced actual fishing effort is
Suppose tbat each year tbe advice received by tbe fisheries minister did precisely
situation, TACs for some stocks would vary significantly between years, perhaps by as
much as 25-50 percent. How could a modern industry geared up to capture and process
the maximum catches react to years oflow TACs? How could a politician survive having
to bankrupt part oftbe industry,whenastockbecame unavailable? (Longhurst, 1999).
Tbus, tbe uncertainty inherent in fisheries science was most useful to a profit-driven
industry and ambitious politicians.
Tbefollowingsectionconsidershowtbestructureofdecision-makingandtbe
policies formulated imposed pressures on scientists and finally how tbe weaknessesin
science were manipulated in order to legitimize government policy, specifically
overcapitalization.
TbeStructnreofDecisioo-Making
TbeCanadianstates'sponsorshipoffisheriessciencedatesfromtbecreationby
Act ofParliament in 1895 oftbe Fisheries Research Board (FRB) (chaired by tbe
Minister ofMarine and Fisheries but staffed on a voluntary basis by scientists from the
nation's universities) and the establishment ofa summer research station in St. Andrew's,
New Brunswick. It was incorporated in 1973 within the structure of the Ministry of
Environment, Fisheries and Marine Services. In 1979 it was renamed the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans. Its creation allowed for the full integration of fisheries science
withinapoliticalbody. The duties, power, functions ofthe Minister ofFisheries are
extensive. The establishment ofDFO placed the respoDSlbility for managing Eastern
Canada'sgroundfishfisherieswiththefederalgovernment.Witbinfourteenyears,the
commercial exploitation ofNorthern cod that DFO undertook to manage ended, due to a
nearly one bundred-fold reduction in spawner biomass ofwhat was once the largest cod
fishery in the world (Hutchings etal., 1997). According to Hutchings etal.:
HIt is the role ofthe Minister and not ofpublic servants to make policy decisions
affecting thefishery. This direct consequence ofthe Act that established DFO has
led to the assumption that science can be used in policy assessment withoutthe
necessity ofhavingscientiftc questions stated explicitly in terms ofprecise and
particularpolicyaltematives"(Hutchingsetal.,1997,p.1199).
The present system. of fisheries management is strucrured on the premise thatscienccis
capable ofproviding the system with precise and reliable stock assessment and can
project the consequences ofaltemativemanagement strategies. Finiaysonquestions"isit
reasonable and responsible to predicate policy development. management strategies and
exploitation on the assumption that science is capable ofprovidingprecise and certain
knowledge?" (Finlayson, 1994,p. 131).
There was a closed-shop attitude at DFO, and within its fisheries science DFO's
CAFSAC was not koown for being open to comment from outside, nor for making its
papers available to others. Yet it was the sole originator ofstock assessment advice to the
minister,withwbichhehadannuallytosetTACsforeachsectorofeachfishery. The
assessment documents received by the minister were "smoothed and polished" bya
numberofintemal sulH:ommiltees and finally reviewed by a government-industry
forum. Small wonder that they were criticized as lacking in error terms or alternatives,
and as being crafted so as to be palatable to the minister and acceptable to industry. The
cardinal rule in the public service is only one set ofadvice goes forward to the minister
(M. Harris, 1998). Regional managers see themselves as having considerable discretion
in what they "should send, must seod andean send to Ottawa" (Apostle et al., 1998, p.
51). One suspects that the levels of scientific uncertaioty and the reasons for them were
not properly explained (LonghUIst, 1999, Finlayson. 1994,M.Harris, 1998).
In Lament for an Ocean Michael Harris reports on former DFO fisheries scientist,
JeffHutchings' disgust at how scientific results are filtered up to the minister. "Wehave
someone well up in the bureaucracy in a position to alter scientijic statements.
Bureaucrats and scientists in that department have an overridingresponsibility to defend
the minister's position" (M. Harris, 1998, p. 294). Presumably. defending the minister's
position means legitimizing policies that are not necessarily compatible with
"pessimistic" stock assessment. Therefore? "good" fisheries science may not make any
difference to protection of the resource. Hutchings el al. argue "bureaucratic intervention
has deleteriously influenced the ability ofscientists to contribute effectively to fisheries
management." (Hutchingsetal., 1997,p. 1204).
Strong disagreement at CAFSAC meetings does not make it into the reports to the
minister. Papers ofscientists with different conclusions are filed away and stay within
thedepartrnent. The scientific advice is then matched with the management objectives of
thedepartrnent (M.Harris,1998). It is easy to understaodhowthis "filteriog" of
important stock information can lead to conflicts. Finlayson (1994) says that the
relationship between science and the state has always been coloured by a struggle over
their respective rights and duties and. in particular, control of the direction ofscientific
activities. The struggle is part ofthe state's desire to assert full control and science's
maneuvering to preserve some measure of independence (Apostle et aI., 1998). An
examination ofthe process inaction follows.
Despite evidence in 1986-1988 that Northern cod stocks were in trouble, Canada
continued to fish hard and downplay negative scientific advice. In fact, it took at least
two years before the managers at DFO recommended lowering the TAC. Despite the
DFQ-commissioned Alverson Report's recommendation that the 1988 TAC be pegged at
19871evels (as aminimurnmanagementresponse),DFO raised the 1988 quota of
Northern cod by 10,000 tonnes to 266,000 tonnes. In December, 1988, DFO scientists
125,000 tonnes - a stunning reversal of advice but a necessary one as CAFSAC had in a
retrospective analysis determined that from as early as 1981,eastcoastfishermenhad
been fishing at over twice the F•. , level for Northern cod. With this determination
acknowledged. the TAC would now have to be slashed in half. In spite of this, Minister
Siddon went with a TAC of235,Ooo tonnes. He said that he could not possibly cut so
manyjobsovemighl. The 235,000 tonnes were allowed regardless ofbiological
consequences. According to Cabot Martin, the fishahle biomass at the time was ouly
600,000 tonnes - catching 235,000 of it was madness! (M. Harris, 1998). It would
appear that scientific advice deemed incompatible with the social and economic
objectives ofthe federal government was ignored. Consider another example ofthis.
When the new fisheries minister, Bernard Valcourt, set the TAC for 1990 at 190,000
tonnesand established a policy of 'enterprise allocations', the fisheryoflice inPortaux
Basques was trashed. the'rioters' thereby gaining an extra quota ofredfish. Furtherto
this, the 1991 TAC was set at 190,000 (later 197,000 due to a lobby by 10hn Crosbie - see
Employment, Snbsidies and Overcapitalization). Yet, "fishing flat out with the
deadliest gear on the water" fishermenwereonlyabletoeatch 127,OOOtonnes. Nature
was now setting the TAC. The senior science bureaucrats smoothed out dissenting
opinions and told the minister what he wanted to hear. The minister in turn continued to
use science to justifY what he needed to do politicalJy. Hutchingsetal.believethat
inclusions of fisheries science witbin a political body can pennit analysis presented by
that body to be portrayed as being based on science, thereby legitimizinggovemment
policyanddepartrnentobjectives(Hutchingsetal.,1997,p.1203). Thequestionnow
arises how could fisheries science at DFO allow itself to be used in this political game of
There is good reason to believe that science had a large hand in the creationofthe
unrealisticexpectationsthatitlaterwarnedagainsl. Inordertojustifyandmaintain
authority internationally with the EEZ extension to 200 miles, DFO created a
smokescreenthatenabledittoenjoyafinereputationfroml977-1989intheintemational
science community. DFO had boasted that its management ofthe resource would
produce so much fish that there would be too much for the inshore to catchall by itself
(Finlayson, 1994). Certainly this was not a milieu witbin which scientists could afford to
questionthernselves-aprestigiousreputationwasatstakeandtheministerwasrelying
on them for scientific input to policy decisions. "Having made large investments in the
production ofknowledge and having originally certified it as valid, the institution will not
lightly decertijY its validity" (Finlayson, 1994).
An important argument for the Canadian case in negotiating the extended
jurisdiction to 200 miles in 1977,wasthatCanadahadtheexpertisetomanagethiszone
so as to rebuild the depleted stock. This self-imposed superior scientific reputation
convinced DFO fisheries science that it was so. The 200 mile extended jurisdiction put
huge demands on science as the fishing industry expected to increase its presence. Since
management decisions are usually justified by stock assessments, the role ofscience and
scientists is "supposedly" crucial. Yet, there are problems in balancing scientific advice
against the short-run interests of industry and the broader objectives ofgovemment
(Apostleetal.,1998). It is useful to consider some of the pressure and demands on
The demands listed here impact on all fisheries scientists in their work, and
specificallyupon,DFOscientists.
- The complexity and relative inaccessibility ofthe marine environment
undennines certainty in the work of the fisberies scientist (see also
Ludwig,HilbornandWalten).
- Scientists work in a social environment where judgments may not be
immune to political pressure. Also fisheries scientists work from
assumptions that reflect a certain view on nature, people and society
(Apostleetal.,1998,Maguire,I995).
- The context in which they must produce useful information is a year
round capital intensive industry with year round search and kill technology
-technology that can take huge amounts offish and find them in their
"hiding" places (Ommer, 1995).
- PolicymakersdemandcertaintyinordertoformuiatereguIations.
When no certainty exists political and economic interest groups can
manipulate issues. This makes it difficult for fisheries scientists to defend
their analysis (Apostle et al., 1998).
- The entire scientific assessment process occurs within a highly
politicizedbureaucracy.Steeleetal.(l992)seetheroleofscientistsasin
the"blackbox"ofgovernmentdecision-making,wheretheyare
imbedded, dependent upon and subservient to the state. McCorquodale
(1994) says this dependence ofgovernment scientists lies at the root of
much of the blame for fishery collapse.
-The management system based on restricting effort and catch through
TACs means there is an incredible pressure to misreport by harvesters.
This leads to incomplete and inaccurate data from industry when reporting
CUPE (see also Strategic Failures). This weakens and threatens the
credibility and authority ofscience from the point ofview of industry, who
kuow what they are doing, and policy-makers who question the validity of
the stock assessments (Apostleetal.,l998).
-Thereispressuretosubmitanalysisandresultsinaveryshorttime
frame. LaITy Coady, Acting Director ofthe DFO Science Branch, in
Finlayson, suggests thai the political demand 10 produce projections
originaled in the fisbing industry's need forstralegic financial planning.
Industry and managers demanded long-range projections that were
impossible 10 give and threatened thai ifscientists could nol produce such
projections the work would be banded over 10 economists (Finlayson,
1994).
- Task forces established 10 investigaleproblems in fisheries often use
scientific research investigations as a delaying tactic. Scientists can spend
valuable time with such task forces carrying out research and reviewing
data. Since the establishmenl ofa Federal fisheries departmenl in 1860.
well over one hundred reports have been commissioned and received but
nol one has been fully implemenled (Parsonsetal..1993).
-Finally. il is importanllo look closely al the very structure and promotion
system within DFO. "The root cause ofthe problems seems /0 be that the
criteria governing the reward and promotion ofindividual scientists is not
strongly linked to their production ofuseful. robust knowledge in support
oftheir institutional mandate" (Finlayson, 1994.p.93). Scientists are
rewarded and promoled based on their record ofpublications in scientific
andacademicjoumals. From the scientists' point ofview there are no
incentives for directing one's research lowardproblerns of interest 10 the
client groups e.g. fisbermen and industry and service 10 the institution. II
would seem logical therefore that stock assessments would nolbe given
the priority that research publication would.
There were good solid reasons for the "weak" fisheries science that the Harris Panel
exposed,-reasonsbothwithinthenaturalenvironmentandwithinthebureaucratic
environment. Thecreationofan"aurau of the superiority in Canadian fisheries science
made it difficult for DFO scientists to dispel the myth. Their bureaucratic inclusion made
it impossible to communicate directly to the public what to expect from science. It was
never made clear that the scientific work was not foolproof. Maybe the scientists came to
believe that it was. John Crosbie refers to this as their "collective mindset" (M. Harris,
1998). Ironically, it was the politicians themselves that set the "superiorsciencett up on
the intemational stage in 1977. In any event, this was their one true fault-they
"oversold" their science and it eventually buried. them when the inshore fishermen started
questioning stock assessment estimates in 1985. At what level the science was oversold
is debatable - presumably it occurred at all levels within DFO. Science accommodated
the bureaucracy's demands for certified, unequivocal knowledge. "It is reasonable to
suppose that the state would not long continue to sanction and support the activitiesof
DFO science were it not responsive to the needs of the patron" (Finlayson, 1994,p. 1.46).
Is it possible that DFO's commissioning ofthe Harris Report may very well have been
indicative of the discontinuation ofsupport forDFO science? Finlayson writes that:
"a knowledgeable. necessarily anonymous source claims (with first hand
authority)thattwointemationallyprominentfisheriesscientistsrejUsed
invitations to serve on the [Harris Panel] when it was made clear to them that
certainpolitically-directedconcfusionswDu/dberequired. Theseweresaidtobe
that the Science Branch in Newfoundland must be publicly humiliated and thrown
to the political wolves... After the release ofthe Harris report. members ofthe
Science Branch were subjected to a sustained and unmitigated storm ofvery
public and highlypublicized abusive criticism. Whether or not the Minister of
Fisheries (Tom SuJdon) had indeed directed Harris to throw the Science Branch
tothewolves,thescientistscertainlyhadgoodreasontobelieveitwasso,
especially as the Minister and other powerfUl members ofthe government ofthe
day-specifically;JohnCrosbie-declinedtocometotheirdefence" (Finlayson,
1994,pp.64-65).
Further strength for the argument that decision-makers and politicians commissioned the
Harris Panel to discredit science in order to advance their own agendas can be found ina
newspapereditorialquotingJohnCrosbieinFinlayson(l994,p65). Hesaidthatthe
findings ofthe Harris Report were grounds for disregarding scientific advice on Northern
cod management infavourofsocio-economic and political considerations. Examples of
this disregarding ofscientific advice are listed in Scientific Advice vs. Political Will.
The socio-economic and political considerations this advice was disregarded in favour of
An internal report commissioned by Acting Director of the DFO Science Branch
Larry Coady in March 1993 showed that some scientists believed that bureaucrats were
distorting scientific findings to suit apolitical agenda prior to the cod moratorium. The
reportconclude~"scienti.ficinformation,specificallytheroleoftheenvironment.was
gruesomely mangled and corrupted to meet political ends" (M. Harris, 1998, p. 300).
Mac Mercer, then Director ofDFO's Newfoundland Region Science Branch says that
lithe origins ofthe crisis were to be found in the social. economic and political decisioos
embedded within the policy and practice ofmanagement. The crisis had nothing to do
withscience"(Finlayson,1994,p.134).
In a 1997 interview with Michael Harris, John Crosbie concedes there were
problems with science fitting into the govemment structure. This was an interesting
comment considering his beliefthat "we had to slavishly follow the opinions ofmarine
biologists and I was not going to [as minister]. Theiradvicewasgivenasguidancebut
the cabinet had to live with the social and economic consequences ofthe resource
situation"(M.Hanis, 1998,p. 116).
D.L. Alverson, a member ofthe Hanis Panel, says we must expect that all
members of the industry (fishers, processors, banks and unions) will always seek to
maximize the economic opportunities within constraints imposed by the law. lfthese
group pressures over-jnf1uence those responsible for fisheries policy and fisheries
regulations and their enforcement, the fault lies with the policy and decision-makers,
enforcement officials and their political masters (Alverson, 1993, p. 89). Thiswould
explain why DFO was unable to concede that massive overfishing was the primary reason
for the collapse ofthe Northern cod stock. This reason was accepted in scientific circles
(Steele etal., (1992),L. Hanis, (1993), Hutchings etal., (1995), (1997),(1999),
Alverson, (1993), McCorquodale, (1994), Sinclair, (1997)). Yet the DFO sanctioned
publication ofthe 1993 book The Management ofMarine Fisheries in Canada by Dr.
Scott Parsons, Assistant Deputy Minister of Science, says that the Northern cod stock
collapse was caused by "natural factors". According to Michael Harris, scientists were
not allowed to speak out about the causes ofthe cod moratorium. "DFO spin doctors
wereatworktellingthepublicthatcoldwaterandseals,notoverfishing,hadcaused the
collapse" (M.Hanis,1998,p.301).
This section has discussed the structure ofdecision-making inDFO, explained
specific incidents ofbureaucrats and politicians disregarding scientific advice and
considered the pressures and demands on scientists that led to their "exposure" in the
Harris report. What, one asks, were the decision-makers using science, weak or
otherwisc7 topromoteandlegitimize? To answer this question it is necessary to go back
to 1982 and meet Michael Kirby.
5.4 Objectives that Guided Fisheries Policies
Fisheries to study the growing financial problems in the fishing industry and to determine
permanent solutions. Senior federal bureaucrat Micbael Kirby was chosen to head this
Task Force. His report, co=only known as the "Kirby Report" (1983), laid down new
objectives to guide fisheries policy. It is useful to first consider three fundamental
assumptions on which these objectives were based.
I) Fish is comparable to any other national resource and shonldbe exploited accordingly
2) Efficiency can best be achieved through a strategy ofindustrialization.
(These two assumptions legitimized the modernization ofthe fishery.)
3) State intervention is necessary to rationalize fishing effort, given the co=on property
nature of the resource (House, 1986). This assumptionwonld have been the basic
premise behind the introduction of limited entry-forreasons ofeconomic efficiency as
One cannot help wondering how fish could be compared to other national
resources. Fishing is suchacomplexactivity-biologically,socially, and economically
and based on open access or common property rights, belonging to all. Tobringstability
to the fishing industry the Kirby Report proposed three objectives. Thefirstobjective
was sustained economic viability ofthe fishing industry. This objective was viewed in
terms ofcontrolling harvesting capacity and cutting costs, thereby reducing dependency
on government subsidies. This, of course, never happened (see Employment, Subsidies
and Overc:apitalization).
The second objective is the maxmJ·uza·tionofemploymentatreasonableincome
levels. This emphasizes the need for the fishery to employ as many people as possible,
given that it is located in an economically disadvantaged region ofCanada and that in a
large part of that region the fishing industry is the only source ofemployment (Kirby,
1983,p.187). Thisiskeyconsideringthemassiveoverexploitationand
overcapitalizationthatcontinuedthroughtheI980s(seeOvereapitalization).
The third objective stated in the Kirby Report, is the Canadianizationofthe
fishery within the Canadian zone. The idea behind this objective is national control over
the fisheries resources within the 200 mile EEZ, wbichshould be harvested and processed
by firms located in Canada and owned by Canadians. There are inherentconfliets
between the first two objectives. Strengthening the economic efficiency of the industry
will not always be compatible with a goal ofmllXl·IQl·zm·g employment opportunities.
Trade-offs will be shaped by power relationships and institutional structures and reflected
in policies of management. These goals are "mutually incompatible" (Apostle ef aI.,
1998).
Policy-makersmustbalanceconflictingobjectives. Economic efficiency in the
fisheries must be reconciled with concerns such as social justice, regional development,
resource conservation and environmental protection. They must also balance what needs
urgent attention in the short run such as community support in crises and what is required
in the longrun, such as, strategies to enhance the viability ofthe stock. Theseconcerns
are rarely compatible. Another complicating factor for policy-making is that fisheries
policy is no longer the exclusive domain ofnational governments. Fisheries can be
squeezed between domestic demands and international obligations. Itappearsthatthe
Kirby Task Force thought ofeverything but the fish (M. Harris, 1998).
With these objectives, bureaucrats set out to devise a federal fisheries policy that
was skewed by incompatible visions ofwhat the industry should be: asocial fishery.
"DFO became a specialized social welfare deportment in which the biology ofthe fish
and conservation ofthe stocks were <ifterthoughts" (M. Harris, 1998, p. 71). The Dunne
Report acknowledged that policy positions on Northern cod gradually eroded so that by
the late 1980s the policy was unclear (Ounne,1990). Policies ofemployment based on
unemployment insurance premiums, massive subsidies and overcapitalization became
"business as usual" throughout the 1980sandearly 1990s.
5.5 Employment, Subsidies and Overcapitalization
1bis report will show that the federal government used the authority of fisheries
science to make policy decisions based on objectives that had little to do with marine
resource capacity. What were these policy decisions that were pursued regardless of the
scientific advice but promoted as ifsanctioned by science? The fishery was used to
absorb excess labour in rural Newfoundland. The federal government supported short-
term fisheries employment augmented with unemployment insurance. The federal and
provincial government subsidized the fishing industry to such an extent that it became
massively overcapitalized. Additionally, the federal government used the marine
resources in international trade arrangements and then jeopardized them by its inability to
prevent foreign over-fishing. Scientists were expected to produce data that would support
all ofthese policy initiatives.
According to Schrank(1995),the federal government permitted the industry to
grow completely out ofcontrol until it was too late. Canada is still paying the price
because of the resultant overfishing. Governments had always treated the fishery as the
employer of las! resort in Atlantic Canada. A confidential 1970 memorandum to the
federal cabinet that sought to outline a plan for the economic rationalization ofCanada's
fisheries stated that the main objective ofgovernment policy has been to maximize
employment in Canada's commercial fisheries. Both John Crosbie and Clyde Wells
agreed on the usefulness of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program (now called
Employment Insurance) in keeping fishermen in the fishery. Wells said, "To some
degree both governments encouraged the use ofthefisheriesto createqualificationfor
unemployment insurance. .. (M. Harris, 1998, p. 67). It was the easiest way to cope with
the political problems of unemployment. As confirmed by Crosbie "rural Newfoundland
is completely dominated by the unemployment insurance system." (M. Harris, 1998, p.
176).
The incentive behind unemp!oyment insurance, is that fishermen and plant
workers were able to collect federal Ul from November to May if they worked ten weeks
in the inshore fishery. [By 1964, just seven years afterUl was introduced and with no
increase in the general population, there was a33 per cent increase in the number of
inshorefishermen-althoughtheinshorecatchofNortherncodfellbySOpercent! (M.
Harris, 1998,p.67)l. In 1990, 66 per cent ofall fish plant workers who qualified for Ul
did so on the basis of between ten and nineteen weeks ofemployment (Carter, 1993
p.162).
A shortage offish between 1969 and 1975 led 10 a decrease in the number of
fishermen in Newfoundland by one quarter to approximately 14,000. However, by 1980
the number was up to 33,640 (Schrank, 1995 p. 291). In fact, overall the fishery
accounted for 56 per cent ofall employment growth in Newfoundland between 1977 and
1986. For every 100 persons employed in the fishery in 1977, there were about 200
persons employed in 1986 (McCorquodale, 1994, p.97). Income from UI for fishermen
increased substantially over the years. In 1972-73, fishermen received 20.4 million
doUars inUI payments, and by 1988-89,the figure was over 270 million dollars. To put
this in another perspective, in 1981 self-employed fishermen received 96 cents inUI for
every dollar earned. In 1990, they received SI.06 for every dollar earned (Schrank,
1995). How did this happen?
Between1970andl981,thefederalgovemmentsubsidizedtheconstructionof
replacement fishing vessels to the tune of35 percent ofcost. This policy encouraged an
aggressive expansion ofthe inshore sector. The provincial Department ofFisheries in
Newfoundland offered a30 percent fishing gear subsidy 10 help small-boal fishermen
acquirethelalesttechnology. Coupled with the full tax exemptions for fuel and
equipment used at sea, it was a powerful incentive for more Newfoundlanders to join the
fishforce.(DFO,1993).
The number offish plants in the Newfoundland fishery increased from 89 in 1975
to 138 in 1980 to 173 in 1992 (McCorquodale, 1994, p. 96). Regardless ofhow
ineflicient an operation might be, it was always a major political issue to close a plant in
places where there was no alternative employment. Weak businesses were routinely
saved from what would be a normal bankruptcy in any other industry. Subsidies were
paid to new plants and paid again whenever overexpansion threatened to close them. Yet
in 1990 the average utilization rate of plants in Newfoundland was 22 per cent (M.
Harris,1998,p.174). Consider this. The federal government used the public purse to
provide subsidies to plants and fishermen and then accessed the public's marine resource
TAC at 190,000 tonnes. However, with intense lobbying from MP John Crosbie
(Newfoundland's only representative in the federal cabinet and Minister ofTrade and
lndustry)thequotawasincreasedtoI97,000tonnes. The additional 7,OOOtonnes was
giveninordertosavetwoofFishetyProductslnternational's(FPI's)offshoreplants.ln
spite oflhis increased quota, the plants were closed anyway (M. Harris, 1998, p 118).
In the decade between 1981 and 1992,federalandprovincialmoneytofishermen
almost doubled from S21 1,300,000 to $408,700,000. During the same period the
Northern cod resource was driven to collapse (McCorquodale,1994). Subsidies send the
wrong economic signal to fishermen in depleted fisheries because they create incentives
for high levels of fishing. Subsidizing increases in fishing capacity has led to po1itical
pressures for higher quotas, well beyond the natural capacity of the resource (McGinn,
1998) (see also The Views of Ludwig, Hilborn and Walters). Shrank (1995) contends
that there is apanern ofagrand start followed by rather meager results that cbaracterizes
nearly all efforts to reform Canada's fisheries policies (Schrank, 1995). A 1993 study
commissioned by DFO found the degree ofovereapacity in inshore and near-shore sectors
ranged from 38 per cent to 56 per cent (DFO, 1993). Therearemanyproblems
associated with overcapitalization that undermine the good intentions ofaquQta
management system. "ltfosters underreporting. and illegaljishing, undermines gear
regulations. stimu/ates buyer/sel/er arrangements to avoid regulations and encourages
unsafe fishing practices. Berrer science cannot address many ofthe problems confronting
anopenaccessfishery"(A1verson,I993,p.85).
In the face ofgovernment employment/unemployment schemes, the call for better
fisheries science is rather hollow. Overcapitalization makes the fishery artificially
profitable. Because of this people remain in the industry aod continue to over-invest to
get a greater share ofa dwindling resource. It is hard to identifY aoy other business where
capacity increases as productivity decreases! Yet, this has been a trend in most world
fisheries. Overcapitalization creates a gap between promise and performance.
Uncertainty,political pressuresaod social concerns malce it diflicult to accept measures
that would adjust harvestiogcapacity to stock size or to a conservative level. Thereisa
mismatch between harvesting capacity and stock size (Apostleetal., 1998).
5.6 International Relations and Foreign OverfisbiDg
The third aod final policy issue to be considered here is Canada's use of the
fisheries resource in intemational trade arrangements and its inability to control foreign
overfishing. Better fisheries science would not have hadaoy more influence on these
trade arrangements than the existing weak fisheries science. In terms ofCanada's trade
aodinternationalconcerns, for far too long the Atlantic fishery mattered very little in the
federal scheme of things and could too easily become a pawn in a large game
(McCorquodale, 1994). Certainly, scientific advice was not a consideration when the
Canadian government generously gave the USSR a 266,320 tonne quota ofoffshore
spawning capelin in 1978. Capelin are the key baitfish in the marine ecosystem aod a
major food source for Northern cod. Cod follow capelin inshore annually. This quota
was given after the USSR had seve:relyrestricted the capelin catch in Soviet waters
because their stock had collapsed'-ue to overfishing. (M. Harris, 1998).
Because the terms of the 2()1()..mile EEZ extended jurisdiction allowed that any fish
surplus to Canada's needs be offered to other countries, there was great pressure on
Canada to provide this "surplus". dl.ny surplus that Canada could offer to foreign
countriesprovidedabarganingchiFinintemationaltraderelations.Thisputpressureon
fisheries scientists encowaged to d-etermine "'optimistic" stock assessments even when
theyknewitcouldbedetrimentaloorthehealthofthestoclc. Yet, it was determined that
allowing such surpluses for Spain and Portugal was simply inviting disaster. Despite
being members ofand subject to tIL.., quotas laid down by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO), the European Community (EC) permitted its national fleets to fish
in international waters at levels far ::higher than NAFO quotas. Because cod migrate
across internationai zones (outsidetthe 200 mile limit on the "Nose" and "Tail" of the
Grand Banks), these "higher" EC CfUOtas are problematic. The EC totally ignored the
1990 NAFO quota of 15,377 tonne5 on the Nose and Tail ofthe Grand Banlc, setting its
ownquotaof60,000tonnes. Yet, Spain and Portugai took 62,000 and 32,000
respectively. Michael Harris (1998:) questions how could Canada impose sanctions
against the EC with its huge popul31tionof325 millionpeople-they purchased 20 per
cent ofNewfoundland's and 8 per c::ent ofCanada's exports. Canada's position of using
diplomatic channels to stop the fore:ignoverfishingwasadismai failure. Surprisingly,
Ottawa concluded in 1990 that the li>est chance ofpersuading theEC to stop overfishing
was to offer underutilized species iosidethe Canadian zone.
Dr. Leslie Harris believes that the beginning of the coUapseofthe stock goes back
to foreign fishing ofthe late 1960s.
"IthinkthotthejirstgreatassaultontheNorthemcod,theonefromwhichthe
stock has never really recovered. was almost tOla/ly aforeign assault. Thiswas
back in 1960, 1969 and 1970 when the Germansjirst appeared, then subsequently
other East Europeans. They hod developed the technology to allow them to jish
in deep water and ice infested waters. This was the first assault on a pristine cod
population, the Hamilton Bank stock. This was thejirst time it wasjished during
spawning" (M. Harris, 1998, p. 6).
Foreign fishing with its generously "self-regulated" quotas imposed extraordinary
pressure on the cod stocks. Ottawa's chosen measures ofdiplomacy did little in the face
ofthe intent ofthe Spanish and Portuguese fleets to fish as they chose. Fisheries mattered
relativelylittleonCanada'sintemationaiagenda. However, with no regulations for these
foreign fleets our valuable resource was stolen. It is difficult to imagine that good
scientific advice would have made any difference to foreign overfishing through the
To surrunarize, Canada's policy of using the fishery as a make-work project,
subsidizedbyUl,inappropriatequotas,andmassivesubsidies led to anovercapacityof
unrealistic proportions. Matching a limited resource to an unlimited desire was a sorry
game. Not only was this industry out ofcontrol in Canadian waters; the unregulated
scientist in this massive overexpioitation was a minor one. "Fisheries science is afacyade
that provides government with the authority ofscience for decisions made primarily on
other grounds." (Finlayson, 1994,p.3). The evidence presented here can confirm this.
Further to this, the simplistic but commonly held presupposition that more eco1ogieal
science leads to better fisheries management is erroneous. There are many obstacles in
the application ofscience to public policy (Scandol.1998,p.369). Such obstaclesare
logistical, economic, social and political in nature. Scandol'scontentionthatmore
science does not lead to better fisheries management is true in the case of the Northern
cod collapse. Dr. Harris's call forbetterscience.has merit and is well intended but not
theanswer. The question arises can this contention of Scandol's be applied as a rule in
marine exploitation?
The final section ofthis paper considers this important question. The
controversial 1993 paper by eminent fisheries scientists Donald Ludwig, Ray Hilborn and
Carl Walters, "Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation and Conservation: Lessons from
History", provides some useful insights.
6.1 TbeViews of Ludwig, Hilborn and Walters
Ludwig eta/. (1993) challenge the idea that good science will prevent stock
collapse. Fisheriespolicyfoundeduponscientificinformationreflectsignoranceofthe
history of resource exploitation. The authors tell us that we should not be deluded into
thinking that prevention ofstock collapse is entirely or even primarily a scientific issue.
Ludwig eta/. list a number ofconsistent features ofresource exploitationthatinevitably
lead to stock collapse.
First, wealth generates power, socially and politically and this promotes unlimited
exploitationofresources-themore immediate the prospects for gain, the greater the
political power that is used to facilitate unlimited exploitation.
Second, the lack ofcontrols and replicates that are possible on large-scale
ecosystem experiments hampers scientific understanding and consensus regarding pasr
events and predictions involving future events. TIrisallowsamplescopefordiffering
interpretations. Some ofthe time-scales ofmarine ecosystem cycles are a decade or
more. Therefore observational studies are unlikely to provide timely indications of
required actions or the consequences of failing to take remedial measures.
Third, Ludwigetal. (1993) contend that the complexity ofthe underlying
biological and physical systems means that optimum levels ofexploitation must be
determined by trial and error. The concept ofmaximum sustainable yield (MSY) has
guided fisheries management for some time. It was conceived to maximize yield.
However, fisheries scientists have been unable to control the technique, the distribution
and amount of fishing effort and the data collected provided little inforrnationaboutthe
biological characteristics of the exploited fish stocks. As well, it is nowdeterrnined that
there is rarely steady abundance, but fluctuations levels andinconcentrationinfish
stocks. This fact, together with societal priorities determined by political power led to
what Ludwigetal. (1993) call the ratchet effect. Thistakestheforrnofanexpansionof
fishing when natural fluctuations lead to larger than average populations; then there are
subsidies to preserve the higher levels ofactivity rather than cutback, toalower level of
activity, when natural fluctuations lead to smaller than average populations.
"Such levels are often excessive. Then a sequence ofgoodyears encourages
additional irrvestment in vessels or processing capacity. When conditions return
to normal or below normal, the industry appeals to the governmentfor help;
often,substantiaiinvestmentsandmanyjobsareatstake. Thegovernmental
response typica/ly is director indirect subsidies. These maybe thought of
initiallyastemporary,buttheireffectistoencourageover-harvesting. The
ratchet effict Is caused by the lack ofinhibition on investments during good
periods. but strongpressure not to disinvest during poor periodsn (Ludwig et aJ.,
1993,p.I7).
Finally, Ludwigetal. (1993) contend that high levels ofnatural variability mask
effectsofoverexploitation. This is often not detectable until it is itrever.;ible. Becauseof
these influences and limits to fisheries science, Ludwig et al. (1993) feel that there will
never be consensus among scientists and there will always be much uncertainty. Two
examples are given to support this contention. One is the collapse of the California
Sardine fishery. Government scientists recommended an annual quota for this fishery in
ordertopreventthespeciesfrombeingoverfisbed. Yet, the fishing industry,intheir
opposition to quotas found scientists that supported their side and said that it was
impossible to overfish a pelagic stock. Tbesecondcasecitedinsupportoftheirviewwas
thecollapseoftheanchovyfisheryoffPem.Thiswasthemostspectacuiarcollapsein
the history offisheries exploitation-theyielddecreased from a high of 10 million metric
tonnes to near zero in a few years. This collapse bas been extensively studied and there is
stillnoagreementonwhatcausedthecollapse(Ludwigetal.,1993,p.36).
Lugwig et al. explain that there will always be major uncertainties in how
ecological systerns will respond to management actions and that society must make
important decisions in the face of such uncertainty. "Society should not look to
ecologicalresearchastheprimarytooltotellthemwhattodo"(LudwigetaI.1993,p.
36). Tbeauthor.; concede that scientific certainty and consensus alone will not prevent
overexploitationanddestructionofresources. However. the limitations ofscience mean
that we should take a much more cautious approach to resource management.
Ludwig et al. (l993) suggest five principles that resource manager.; should follow:
consider human motivation and responses in planning. Human greed and
shortsightedness may manifest themselves as biologicalproblerns ofthe stock under
exploitation; aet in a timely manner-do not wait for consensus; consider the
shortcomings ofscience, such as the influences that bear on scientific interpretatioosand
accommodations ofuncertainty as well as the need for interaction among disciplines such
as economics, sociology and oceanography; distrust claims ofsustainability as history
tells us so. More basic research in the eco-system may serve only to make us more
complacent and keep us from addressing real issues such as overpopulation and excessive
use of resources; deal with uncertainty. Effective policies are still possible under
conditions of uncertainty as long as such conditions are considered. Action should be
robust to uncertainty, flexible and informed, considering many strategies (Ludwig etal.,
1993,p.36).
Ludwigetal.(l993)concludebysayingthatscientistshaveperpetuatedthe
illusion ofsustainability through scientific and technological progress as governments
continue to base their policies upon misguided views of the dynamics of resource
exploitation. They remind us that resource problems are not really environmental
problems-theyarehumanproblemsthatwehavecreated.
Ludwigetal.aretellingusthatnaturalrestraintsinherentinthemarineecosystem
do not auger well for strong fisheries science, that natural variability ofievelsoffish
stocks leads to the ratchet effect, and that the prospects for gain and wealth in resource
exploitation drive the political will to overexploit. The temptation to increase the yield at
the expense of risk to the resource is irresistible. Economic pressures require maximum
yield-areflectionofhurnandesires.
"Resource management is a discipline whose history is replete with spectacular
failures. but whose practitioners seldom change their policies in response to past
experience. This;saninstitutionalpatternofstereotypicresponsetorepeated
failure ... This is the inevitable consequence ofa contradiction belWeen human
desires and human capabilities. a magic theory that purports to satisfy unlimited
consumption with limited resources... the miracle ofthe loaves and the fishes has
becomeanobjectiveofpolicy.(D.Ludwig,1993,p.555).
Thereforescientificknowledgewillnotnecessarilyimplythatfisberies
management decisions will be taken that support sucb information. Putting our bopein
good science, as Harris considers a goal, is merely a trap in providing falsebope fortbe
prevention ofstock collapse and for a sustainable pattern of exploitation. The issue of
stock collapse bas less to do witb scientific and environmental problems and more to do
witbbumanproblems.Itisabouttbeexerciseofpoliticalpowerwberesbort-term
priorities override long-term societal priorities.
6.2 Support for Ludwig, Hilbom andWalten
Ludwigeta/.(1993)arguethattbepatterntbatleadstostockcollapseistbepatternthat
occurred in tbe overexploitation oftbe Northern cod stock. What otber evidence exists to
support tbeir ideas? There are several examples to consider. Thefacttbatover90per
cent oftbe world's fisb stocks bave been overexploited underscores Ludwig et a/(1993).
Alverson (1995) says tbattbe efl'ects offisbingare consistently underestimated and
poorly understood by managers. Consideringthatindustrialfisberiesgloballynowrely
on 50 billion dollars (US) ofsubsidy per year, underlines tbe problems oftbe ratcbet
efl'ectandovercapitalization(pauly,1999). AntbonyCbarles(1994)telisustbattbe
fisbery is used to absorb excess labour in order to sustain broader societal goals. This is
evident in tbe Newfoundland fisbery wbentbenumberoffisbermen increased as tbe
resoureedeclined. The fisbery was used to address tbe unemployment problems in rural
areas. Cbarles says thattbis reduces sustainabilityoftbe fisbery resource and tbe fisbery
system as a whole. Another confirmation ofLudwig et al. (1993) assertions comes from
TonyPitcher. He says that: "stock assessment has been stuck for thirty years in a safe
yield per recruit universe oounded by the comforting notion that fishers will stop fishing
aseconomicretumsdiminish. We now know that this is not so as fishers improve gear,
gofurtberafieldandswitchtospeciesfurtberdownthefoodweb"(pitcher,1998,p.369).
In fact, this is now happening in Newfoundland (see Conclusions).
Economic ecologist Robert Costanza (1993) says that science is used by those in
power to fulfill conflicting desires. Because ofuncertainty in science, political and
economic interest groups can often manipulate environmental issues. He is supported in
this by Marc Mangel (1993) who says that the scientific community can be forced into
negotiatedagreementwhenitfailstodifferentiatebetweenscienceandpolicy,when it
fails to separate fact and value judgment. Tbis is evident in the review of the Harris
Report. "Social constraints on greed fail in natural resource exploitation" (Lee, 1993)
and"sociaidynamicsgenerailyleadtooverexploitation"(Ehrlich, 1993, p. 558). Cabot
Martin reminds us that political choices are often framed as biological ones (Martin,
1992,p.155).Thus"blarnethescientists".WilIiarnSchrankconfinnstheratcheteffect
inaction. He says that
"resource-basedfluctuations ofhigh magnitude (changes in catch ofup to 90 per
cent in a year) cause a steep and unusually unforeseen fall or rise in earnings and
profits. Industry reaction to thisjiJrm ofuncertaintyfrequently has been to install
sufficient catching andprocessing capacity to handle the peaks in supply, thereby
inflating industrial overheads and reinforcing the inherent tendency towards
over-expansion in the commercialfisheries". (Schrank, 1994, p. 288).
McGinn(1998)confinnsthisaswell. She says that in response to declining yields most
fishers over-invest. Finally there are some important figures to consider: II ofthe
world's 15 most important fishing areas and 60 percent ofthe major fish species are in
decline due to excessive exploitation and other abuses. Whereas no fish stocks were in
urgent need ofmanagement in 1950, today a majority of the world's fisheries qualuyfor
that dubious distinction and require immediate action to reduce capacity and rehabilitate
damaged resources (McGinn, 1998, p. 12). However technology may not allow for such
rehabilitation. The increase in fleet size and the development of larger and safer vessels
has resulted in significant excess fishing capacity, which can be rapidly transferred from
one overfished stock or area to the next. As a consequence, the full exploitation and
depletion ofthe remaining world resources, which in the 1950s would have taken 10
years or more to reach, can now be reached instantly (Garcia,1994,p.25).
So yes to Ludwigetal.(1993),thereisapattemofresourceexploitationthat
inevitably leads to overexploitation, and the issues are not prirnarily scientific. Resource
protection is not about science. It is an obligation ofhuman responsibility, individual
responsibility and coUective responsibility. Goodevidenceexiststhatoverfishingis
pervasive on a global scale. Responsibility for natural resources management is vested in
nationalandinternatiouaigovemmenrs.Thosegroupsmusrbeartheresponsibilityforthe
historical course of natural resource management. Industry maximizes its economic
oppornmities within a competitive environment, social attirudes and legal regimes. If
industrial pressures over-influence those responsible for policy and regulations and their
enforcement, the fault lies with policy and decision-makers, enforcement officialsand
theirpoliticalmasrers (A1verson,1995,p.6).
An underlying assumption of fisheries management is that the control of nature is
within the range ofhuman capacity and that negative social impacts of policies can be
remedied through compensation schemes. Politics should be mled out of the fishery.
Politics have come to corrupt the management process and social concems have loomed
larger than bioeconomic imperatives (ScandoI.1998,p.34l).
The purpose of this report was to analyze the role that weak fisheries science
played in the Northem cod collapse in Newfoundland and ifbetter fisheries science
would have prevented this collapse. It established the weakness in fisheries science
through a review ofthe Harris Report, analyzed the strategic failures in science that
allowed decision-makers to impose policies that had social and economic objectivesand
specifically, how these policies were actually imposed. It considered the pressures and
demands on scientists and the objectives of federal policy that led to overexploitation.
lbis report contends that it was the very weakness in science that facilitated such policy
enforcement. Finally, this report considered the role of fisheries science in marine
exploitation in general. It considered the viewpoints of three fisheries scientists who feel
that there is apattem ofexploitation that inevitably leads to stock collapse and this
pattem ofexploitation is for reasons beyond fisheries science. There is much support for
this view and the confirmation of its reality is in the huge subsidies for world fisheries
and the fact that almost all major fisheries are overexploited. What can society do to
changethispattemofexploitation? Before answering this question it is useful to revisit
the Newfoundland fisheries in 1999. The Newfoundland fishery (as of December 1999)
is worth nearly onebilliondollars-thehighestfigure ever, by far. Withgroundfish
depleted.,theharvestershavefoundanewspecies-shellfish,andtheyareplentiful-for
now. It appears that fishermen are following a familiar pattemofexploitation. Quotas
have increased, capacity has increased,andefforthas increased. AccordingtoMichael
Harris,
~~Ottawa has sanctioned a dramatic increase in harvesting capacity, set quotas in
one place at 10 times the levels ofjust 6 years ago and unleashed the inshore and
offshore sectors on this new dollar bonanza without even bothering to do a stock
status report ofNorthem shrimp and snow crab in Newfoundland waters for the
1998 and 1999 fishing seasons. It is small wonder that the Auditor General
concluded in his damning overview ofthe department [DFO] that quotas are
heavilyinfluencedbysocialandeconomicfactors,ratherthanby ...
conservation"(M.HaIris,1999,p.9).
It is important to understand this new fishery within the context ofthe marine
environment. Daniel Pauly says that because larger species feed on species lower down
on the food chain,overfishingtop predators such as cod or tuna or shark triggers aslow-
acting domino effect.
"At higher levels ofthe food chain, fish are bigger, but there arefewer ofthem
than at lower levels, where species are smaller and more plentifUl. Initially, the
transitionfrom high-level species to ones lower on the food chain brings new
bounty. But unless the volume offishing is reduced, the cycle ofoverfishing soon
repeats itselfwith new prey: excessive fishing can trigger abrupt declines in these
lower-level species, leavingfishers only steps awayfrom the base ofthe food
chain".(pauly,1998,p.86l).
In a recent newspaper article, Dr. Leslie Harris was quoted as beingconcernedabout the
pressure now on shellfish stocks with huge quotas and ohservations by fishermen ofsmall
size shrimp-this is generally an early sign ofoverexploitation! Dr. Harris further
expresses concerns about cutbacks to fisheries science this decade. "I think we ought to
be doing a great deal more science and finding a much more substantial knowledge base
for the decisions we are taking." (TheTelegram,1999,p.3) Yes, this is true but two
points to be considered are: it is unlikely that governments will spend more money on
fisheries science. Aiverson(1993) says that there is an erosion ofthe quality ofscientitic
endeavor in much of the developed worid as governments see the cost offisheries
managementaspossiblyexceedingtheeconomicbenefitsofthefisbery. Thesceond
point is that perhaps Dr. Harris should redirect his focus to the bureaucratic institutions
thatmanagefisberiesscience. Crutchfield in Steeleetal.(1992) says that:
"given all the time and all the splendid research that has gone into expandingour
knowledge ofthe sea, its living resources and the technicalproblems of
harvesting them, the results are remarkably disappointing. The number of
programs that hove actually succeeded in checking depletion ofoceanfishstocks
can be counted on the fingers ofone hand Andthose that have protected stocks
while providing some real improvement in earning stability ofemployment, and
ability to withstand the usualeconomicjoltsto which fisheries are subject,canbe
counted by someone with no hands at alP'. (Crutchfield in Steele et al., 1992, p.
62).
This statement was made in a 1980 address. Almost twenty years later, it sadly, still
applies. It reflects what Ludwig etal. (1993) say: that issues of resource protection are
not entirely or even primarily scientific.
lbis report has shown that science is one of many inputs considered indecision-
making. This lucrative crab and shrimp fishery is very good for politicians. Thereis
doubt that the best scientific information will adjust those huge quotas downward. "A
better scientific understanding of the marine environment will be to no avail without the
political will to implement the changes dictated by that understanding." (Meyeretal.,
1993,p.570). It is important that fisberies science recognize that continued calls for
more research can be used as a delaying tactic by proponents ofthe status quo. This
"new"fishery is following a familiar pattern (see Ludwig, Hilbom and WaIters).
To retumto the question, what can society do to prevent resource
overexploitation? Daniel Pauly (1999) says that the public at large who ultimately owns
the resource and whose taxes have so far been used to subsidize the carnage must become
involved. Robert Costanza advises that there must be explicit stabilization at levels of
resource exploitation that are limited by explicit choice rather than by technological
opportuni1y and greed. "Most social systems find both explicit choice and long nul
stabili1y difficult as it requires institutional changes." Those who see benefits intbe
existing definitions will resist these (Costanza, 1993,p.580).
Most of the failures in resource management can be traced to people thinking and
acting as ifoverexploitationwas someone else's problem or that costs could be bome by
others-often future generations of people or less affluent sectors ofsocie1y. Protecting
our fish stocks is about human values and institutions and not just ecological functions.
Dr. Leslie Harris says: "Ofall the creatures that make up the living part ofthe ecosystem,
man stands alone as the one that does not respond to the imperative ofseeking
equilibrium."(L.Harris,1993,p.8). Therefore,donotlooktoscience,looktosociety,to
our politicians and institutions and look to each other. We must create the scenarios that
implore us to be ever vigilant. We must not be trapped into thinking thaI science will
save us from our fam.iliarpattem ofoverexploitation ofmarine resources. Thekindsof
information thaI science is ordinarily able 10 provide are fundamentally at odds with the
types ofdecisions that are made. It is time to identify the obstacles 10 the use ofscientific
information in public policy development and create a means to remove them.
Otherwise, govemmentwill continue 10 develop and impose policies thaI have little 10 do
with marine resource capacity or with science.
The overwhelming findings of the Harris Report did not make a difference. We
did not improve our fisheries science, in fact we imposed huge cuts to the fisheries
science departments atDFO and did not change ourpattemofexploitation-wejust
found another species further down the food chain. Until socie1y takes collective
ownership and stewardship of its resource and refuses to let it be squandered by the
subsidized few, the role of fisheries science maybe relegated to simply predicting the
next stock collapse. Thus, it will be the marine resource dictating the policy objectives, as
did the cod when they disappeared from the nets offNewfoundland.
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